Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License Abstract: Fiscal federalism refers to the attribution of public finance functions among different levels of government. We examine Portugal's metropolitan transportation sector through the fiscal federalist lens, in light of the country's decentralization efforts and new relevant legislation. We clarify basic principles of fiscal federalism and adapt them to the finance of metropolitan transportation systems -typically characterized by multiple jurisdictions, numerous externalities and equity concerns -showing the inadequacy of general practice. Portugal's overall public finance system partially adheres to fiscal federalist principles; the transportation sector less so. Metropolitan transportation faces particular troubles, with few direct user fees, prices inadequately reflecting costs, and heavy reliance on central government subsidies for public transportation investments and operations. A new law creating metropolitan transportation authorities is only modestly consistent with fiscal federalist principles, since it inadequately details financial responsibilities and remains under heavy central government control. Absent additional reforms, the new metropolitan authorities should aim to make the transportation finance system explicit and test incentive grants to induce inter-municipal cooperation.
Introduction
Fiscal federalism refers to the vertical structure of government authorities and the attribution of functions related to revenue collection and expenditures. While theoretical fiscal federalism offers well-defined principles for assigning responsibilities, in practice it faces several challenges, including institutional inertia and capacity, status quo political power and vested interests. Fiscal federalism's specific design requires transparency and flexibility, accounting for political, economic, and cultural conditions. Metropolitan transportation -which typically 4 crosses local jurisdictions, involves multiple institutions, introduces externalities, and requires public-sector participation -could, in theory, benefit from analysis through the fiscal federalist framework.
Portugal's metropolitan transportation situation presents an opportune case for usefully applying the fiscal federalist optic. The sector depends heavily on central government, with discretionary annual appropriations from revenue sources un-linked to the sector or the geographic boundary of system benefits and costs. Since most of these accrue at a metropolitan scale, fiscal federalism suggests devolving administrative power and most financial responsibility to metropolitan-level institutions. While the Portuguese government has been decentralizing many services to municipal governments in recent years, the process has been relatively ad hoc, with municipalities attempting to do the possible with limited available mechanisms and in competition. Over the years national legislative efforts have attempted to While the AMTs were created to support the devolution of transportation administration to an -appropriate‖ functional level, effective AMTs will require adopting fiscal federalism. We consider this a relatively universal condition: a more fiscal federalist-consistent metropolitanlevel transportation system will produce -better‖ outcomes. While we cannot test such a hypothesis with a single case, the Portuguese situation illuminates key issues and challenges, with the fiscal federalist perspective clarifying pathways for enhancing current reforms in 5 Portugal. The case may offer lessons for others grappling with similar challenges. Application of a fiscal federalist lens to the problem may offer generalizable lessons, particularly by analyzing additional cases similarly. Ultimately, we aim to show how to improve metropolitan transportation administration and performance via the finance system.
The next section introduces the concept of fiscal federalism and its relevance to transportation. The third section describes the context and structure of Portugal's transportation finance and administration system and analyzes it through the fiscal federalist lens. The fourth section assesses the new AMT Law, its implementation to date, and its strengths and weaknesses.
We follow with a brief discussion of lessons learned and opportunities for the AMT framework to enable metropolitan transportation more consistent with fiscal federalism. A final section concludes.
Metropolitan Transportation Finance: Theory and Practice
The finance system plays a pivotal role in the efficiency, fiscal stability, and equity of metropolitan 1 transportation. For transportation users, prices paid should reflect relevant resource costs to society, thereby improving efficiency. For planners, a system operating with inaccurate prices will distort planning decisions (e.g., Vickrey, 1969) while an explicit and transparent userbased pricing and revenue system signals justifiable investments and ensures stable revenues.
The finance system can also structure incentives for metropolitan transportation integration:
among sectors, such as land use and transportation; among modes, such as private and public 1 Here metropolitan refers specifically to an urban-regional transportation system that crosses more than one local government (e.g., municipality) boundary. 7 scales of administration. In practice, these sub-systems are interrelated (i.e., inter-sectoral spillovers), requiring some form of inter-sector collaboration or integration (e.g., May et al. 2005; Stead, 2008) . The typical metropolitan challenge: national government is too -distant‖ from the local context to adequately serve the metropolitan -good,‖ while municipal governments have inadequate incentives to think and act beyond their own borders. Fiscal federalism offers a formal way to identify how the public finance system can induce effective metropolitan governance. Bird and Slack (2007) review various forms of metropolitan governance structure -from consolidated, to two-tier, to voluntary, to special districts -and their implications for fiscal structures.
Critical factors in assigning sub-national responsibilities relate to the nature of the service in question (e.g., public or private), the spatial extent of relevant externalities, and/or the existence of scale economies in service production. Regarding revenues, theory supports central government control over highly redistributive taxes, taxes on mobile capital, and taxes on natural resources, while -local‖ control should roughly correspond with user fees (for services) and taxes on non-mobile capital (e.g., land) (Oates, 1993) . This allows for efficiency and administrative ease in revenue collection. For service provision, sub-national governments in a decentralized fiscal system will often have to provide more local services than those which can be funded entirely locally (due to, e.g., the presence of externalities). This introduces the need to coordinate with adjacent and/or higher-level political entities via, for example, financial transfers to resolve problems of horizontal (-equal treatment of equals‖) and vertical equity (-unequal treatment of unequals‖) and inter-jurisdictional pricing and delivery (e.g., for goods with spillovers or externalities). 8
Relevant Principles of Fiscal Federalism
Fiscal equivalence provides the key theoretical link between administrative and fiscal responsibilities: public goods' beneficiaries should match with those who pay (Olson, 1969) , implying sub-national production and resource generation for numerous public goods. Fiscal equivalence and user fee financing can lead to improved efficiency, especially if prices closely match marginal costs and price signals guide investment and management decisions; and fiscal stability, by helping to secure sufficient resources for the relevant service and jurisdiction. Prices should also reflect externalities, whether inter-system, intra-system, and/or inter-jurisdictional.
Even with increased administrative and fiscal autonomy, sub-national governments must still face -hard budget constraints,‖ that is spending limits, to ensure adequate consideration of costs and benefits in the case of transfers from higher level governments. The inter-related dimension of equity introduces additional challenges, including because societies judge many goods to be public and/or -basic rights‖ (e.g., clean water). Applying these principles should lead to more accountable and transparent service investment, operation, and pricing.
Fiscal Federalism and Metropolitan Transportation
Scholars of fiscal federalism often focus on specific local issues, such as education (Calabrese et al, 2012) or tax competition (Brueckner, 2004) , but rarely examine in detail the transportation sector. On the other hand, transportation scholars focusing on finance issues rarely apply, explicitly, the fiscal federalist lens. But, metropolitan transportation merits application of this lens, as it:
 is typically, multi-jurisdictional, crossing numerous local governments, implying the need for inter-jurisdictional transfers or some other level of administration, normally below the national and state/provincial, but above the local/municipal;  produces numerous externalities, positive and negative, which might include labor productivity benefits due to increased mobility, air pollution costs, inter-modal network effects between public and private transportation modes, and congestion; and,  involves equity concerns, such as those relating to societal values about mobility as a public good.
Transportation systems, generally, employ three types of finance mechanisms: direct user fees, such as tolls and fares; indirect user/beneficiary fees/taxes, which might include fuel excise taxes, vehicle registration and licensing fees, and some forms of land value-related mechanisms, such as impact fees and betterment levies; and general taxation, such as sales, income and property taxes. 2 Ideally, the use of these instruments should be guided by the principle of price equal to full marginal social cost, such that:
 infrastructure construction, and maintenance and congestion costs, are recovered via time-, place-, and vehicle type-specific prices;
 energy prices cover the full resource cost and environmental effects directly related to use (such as greenhouse gas emissions);
 local environmental impacts (e.g., air pollution costs) are reflected in environmental fees;
 local agglomeration and accessibility benefits are regained from land value taxation; and,  redistributive objectives are achieved through other mechanisms (e.g., World Bank, 1996) .
At least for roadways, this system would ensure -efficient‖ use, and provide an adequate source of financing (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Small, 1993) .
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In practice, few direct user charges, with the exception of public transport fares and tolled roads, and no precise user charges tend to be employed. For roadways, despite increases in the use of private concessions for metropolitan roadway infrastructure (see Zegras, 2006 ) -which normally introduce some form of marginal cost pricing via tolling -users typically pay for use through a mix of indirect mechanisms (e.g., fuel taxes) and general taxation. Since fuel consumption is relatively inelastic with respect to price, many governments use fuel taxes as a general revenue source rather than a transportation-specific source. Governments sometimes use vehicle ownership fees and fuel taxes to redistribute income. Public transportation fares are often subsidized, indirectly by subsidizing suppliers or directly by subsidizing certain user groupsthese may not always achieve socioeconomic equity objectives (e.g., Serebrisky et al, 2009 ).
Public transportation subsidies can also be justified in the presence of: scale economies, since the right-of-way and capital investment costs are largely insensitive to demand volumes; returns to scale of frequency, the so-called -Mohring effect‖; and, under-priced alternatives, in this case the lack of a fully congestion-priced private vehicle system (e.g., Nelson et al., 2007) .
Analytical, institutional, and political complications exist. Valuing externalities remains a challenge. Infrastructure-supplying -agents‖ are often multiple and fractured across responsibilities (e.g., construction, maintenance), modes (road, rail) and government levels.
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Formally established, transparent transportation budgets -with fees recognized as prices by users -rarely exist, leaving different levels of government scrambling for resources (Zegras, 2003) and muddying debates regarding taxes, user fees, subsidies, -rights‖ to mobility, etc. This situation almost certainly exerts a negative impact on system sustainability. We now illuminate these complexities with a fiscal federalist light on the Portuguese case.
Fiscal Federalism in Portugal
As Portugal has decentralized, challenges to fulfilling fiscal federalist principles remain, impacting efficiency, fiscal stability, and equity. The transportation sector epitomizes these challenges.
The 1976 Constitution of Portugal established a framework for three levels of subnational government: regional, municipal, and freguesia (a municipal government sub-division 4 ).
A 1998 national referendum rejected the creation of regionally elected administrations (Syrett and Silva, 2001) , thus, two elected levels of government exist: central and municipal. According The country's model of metropolitan governance remains loosely coordinated constituent municipal activities, with few and fragmented metropolitan administrative powers, subsidiarity to municipal governments (Oliveira, 2009; Rayle and Zegras, 2012) , and a lack of public finance autonomy. Table 1 summarizes the acronyms used to refer to the relevant institutions in Portugal. 6 The European Union (EU) also plays a supra-national government role, although with limited powers and budgetary size in comparison with a -typical‖ central government (see Oates, 2002) . 
Public Finance Basics
Relative to other OECD countries, Portugal's sub-national governments account for a small share of total government spending (12.8% vs. an average of 34% for 26 selected OECD countries); this share has barely changed since 1985 (Ahmad et al., 2008) . The central government is responsible for some municipal services, while municipalities are responsible for planning and urban development, local roadways, public transportation (except for Lisbon, Porto, and now, Coimbra), public housing, and other typical local services (Câmara Municipal de Coimbra, 2007; Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006 Câmara Municipal do Porto, 2007) , sometimes in financial cooperation with the central government.
Taxing power generally follows fiscal federalist principles: the national government controls taxes on businesses, labor, and sales, while municipalities can levy land and real estate taxes, user fees on local transit, and a small share of corporate taxes. Central government controls various special taxes on fuels, motor vehicles, and alcohol, among others (see Nelson, 2008) , as well as road tolls through its infrastructure concessions program. Although municipalities have relative autonomy in establishing the tax base and rate (OECD, 1999) , municipal revenues constitute a small portion (4%) of total government revenues (OECD, 2007) .
The central government administers the tax system, including collection (and transfer) of most municipal taxes.
The central government redistributes domestic general revenues to improve, among municipalities, vertical equity (accounting for differences in public service costs) and horizontal equity (providing comparable funding levels to comparable municipalities). This includes formula funding and discretionary grants for infrastructure investments ( Portugal generally benefits from transfers under the EU's Cohesion Policy, 7 designed to minimize horizontal imbalances among member states. These include general funds for economic convergence, regional competitiveness, and cross-border cooperation, as well as specific sectoral funds such as the trans-European transportation networks (TEN-T).
8 Table 2 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the Portuguese political system vis-à-vis fiscal federalism. Approximately €555 million of fuel taxes were dedicated to EP. On a discretionary basis, the Portuguese government spent €107 million (out of €2.1 billion) on PIDDAC projects for -transportation and communications‖ (of which €14 million consisted of local co-financing).
Transport Finance and Metropolitanism: Description
Through the SEE, the government spent €260 million on subsidies for transportation state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-sector concessionaires. Nearly €180 million of SEE subsidies went to public transportation operations in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas in 2010 (Table 3) .
Recent reforms of the SEE have focused on greater administrative independence, transferring sector debts off the central government's balance sheet, and securing private finance.
The transportation sector's fiscal situation has not improved. Over the period 2005-2010, public sector income (from all sources, including social security) increased by 3.9% annually (MFAP, 2005; ; total SEE subsidies increased by 5.9% annually; while total subsidies to metropolitan transportation operations (both SOEs and private operators) in Lisbon and Porto increased by 12% annually (Table 3 ). the EU provided 19% of the investment costs, the concessionaire 14%, and municipalities 4% (Gouveia, 2008; Lino, 2007) . In 2010, the 15-km, 19 station MTS system incurred central government operating subsidies estimated at €8 million (MF, 2011), implying a subsidy of €0.27
per passenger kilometer transported (PKT) -more than 16 times higher than the per PKT operating subsidy provided to the Lisbon Metro. 
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The situation hampers fulfillment of fiscal federalism's principles. Subsidizing public transportation operations (and, arguably, investments) can be justified on intra-system externalities grounds, since auto use is under-priced in congested metropolitan areas. But, Portugal's current metropolitan subsidy structure -directly resulting from SEE negotiations with the SOEs and from national government contracts with private companies -pays little heed to intra-system externalities, as evidenced by the recent rapid increase in operating subsidies (Table   3 ). System efficiency likely suffers. These subsidies may serve socioeconomic equity goals, although their effectiveness would require detailed analysis (e.g., Serebrisky et al., 2009 (INE, 2008) . In addition, substantial percentages of metropolitan transportation operating revenues are derived from user fees and local sources (Figure 3) . Thus, the large metropolitan areas are not necessarily getting -more than they should‖ in terms of central government public transport support. Rather, the concerns are poor explicit fiscal equivalency and subsequent lack of transparency and local accountability and the potential appearance of regional inequities. This may also be contributing to the rapid growth in operating subsidies to state-owned and private public transit operators in the metropolitan areas, epitomized most recently by the newly opened MTS on Lisbon's south bank. This trend clearly violates fiscal federalism's hard budget constraint principle, countering any incentive to reform pricing, investment, and management while also not helping to stabilize Portugal's macroeconomic picture.
In summary, metropolitan transportation in Portugal suffers from various inconsistencies regarding efficiency, financial stability, and equitable service and infrastructure delivery (see Table 4 ). Fiscal federalism suggests that transportation expenditures should be derived primarily from metropolitan sources. More clearly aligning these expenditures with direct revenue sources would make the costs and benefits recognizable to the relevant stakeholders. Public transportation fares partly achieve this, but the increasing SEE subsidies to operators (public and private) suggest beneficiaries are not facing the costs implied. The move towards tolled highway PPPs might increase efficiency and fiscal equivalence, but widespread adoption of tolling, especially congestion-pricing, in the metropolitan areas seems unlikely in the short-term.
Furthermore, the PPP contracts and regulatory structure may impede efficient system-wide pricing and management relating to congestion pricing and inter-modality. In the meantime, the reliance on partial earmarking of national fuel taxes, themselves imperfect roadway user fees, mixed with general taxes and unclear criteria for spatial redistribution of the funds blurs the picture. Metropolitan areas, thus, depend highly on central government for transportation investment and operating resources and have little direct control over metropolitan-scale transportation policies.
In this case, a regional government enjoying administrative autonomy, consent from the governed, sufficient fiscal autonomy, and hard-budget constraints has a higher likelihood of 20 arriving at a socially optimal outcome by aligning supply and demand via prices. Even where direct user fees are inefficient or impractical, an empowered metropolitan transportation authority would, at least in theory, more closely align costs to beneficiaries through indirect user fees and taxes. Do the newly created AMTs hold promise towards this end?
Fiscal Federalism and the Portuguese AMT Law
A 2009 Law gives the AMTs responsibility for public transportation, including planning, coordination and regulation, financing and pricing, service promotion and development, integration with local land use plans, operational planning, and strategic planning specifically to -promote‖ the development of urban mobility plans (plano de deslocações urbanas or PDU), in technical collaboration with the IMTT, the national land transportation regulatory body (Table 5 ).
AMTs are also responsible for promoting the development of operational programs for transportation (Programa Operacional de Transportes or POT), a legal instrument defining, for a four-year period, necessary aspects of passenger transport in metropolitan areas, including: public transport itineraries, service levels, fares, traffic, parking, costs, and financing. As described above, the AMTs function as institutions legally separate from the metropolitan areas (AMP and AML), although the latter do have responsibility for appointing some members of the AMTs' General Councils.
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The AMT law offers a reasonable institutional framework for applying fiscal federalist principles to regional transportation in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas. Nonetheless, unclear language about real fiscal power and tools suggests that the AMTs may be unable to implement metropolitan transportation policies in the spirit of fiscal federalism. Furthermore, the 21 dominance of central government appointees on the various AMT councils perpetuates the heavy national influence in metropolitan transportation.
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As of late 2011, the AMTs have been -legally‖ implemented, but remain functioning at a very low level of activity, currently examining the possibilities to reform public transport operations through mergers (suggesting the government may be using the AMTs as a -scapegoat‖ for any negative effects of pushing through institutional reform). With the nation's ongoing financial crisis, no budget has been allocated to finance AMT activities. While council members and some administrative employees have been appointed, most are still waiting for orders and budget and remain employed by other agencies. Without a specific budget allocation, the AMTs will not likely initiate any of the substantive activities prescribed in law. In theory, the AMTs reflect modest steps in the -right‖ direction. Still they focus primarily on public transportation, have little actual recourse to financial instruments, and remain dominated by central government.
In practice, the lack of any movement on AMT formation two years after the law passed signals uncertainty regarding any power eventually accruing to them.
Discussion
Similar to many other countries, metropolitan governance in Portugal remains a challenge.
In Lisbon and Porto, metropolitan governance is a mix of occasional, ad-hoc, and limited voluntary cooperation among municipalities and a few special-purpose bodies. In this respect the 13 The Central Government appoints the president and two vice presidents of the AMT Executive Council and over 50% of the members of the General Council (which serves as a supervisory role over the Executive Council). The law does provide for more prominent representation by the center cities of Lisbon and Porto in their respective AMT General Councils, in some attempt to reflect these cities dominance in terms of metropolitan travel demand.
country shares characteristics with, for example, Brazil and Argentina (Bird and Slack, 2007) .
General metropolitan authority legislation, and transportation-specific legislation have attempted to create a new tier of governance, but with little impact to date. As Bird and Slack (2007) suggest for Latin America, effective metropolitan governance requires an appropriate fiscal structure.
Our analysis shows that such a structure does not yet exist in Portugal. Metropolitan public transportation planning, investment, and regulation in the country are challenged by issues of efficiency, fiscal stability, and equity. Existing incentives promote the delivery of quantities Current institutional arrangements could adversely affect inter-regional equity and intraregional efficiency, especially for metropolitan public transportation. Lisbon's and Porto's public 23 transportation services are provided primarily by companies that depend substantially on central government subsidies, violating fiscal equivalency. In other Portuguese cities, such responsibility rests solely with municipalities and local users and taxpayers, more closely adhering to fiscal equivalency. As such, the system manifests a -partial‖ fiscal equivalency for public transportation operations, but potential, or at least perceived, inequity in favor of residents in the nation's largest metropolitan areas.
The evidence indicates the difficulty with -metropolitanizing‖ transportation in Portugal, with the AMTs apparently lacking the requisite administrative and fiscal powers to advance this objective. By targeting specifically Lisbon and Porto, the law may further exacerbate the perceptions of bias towards these metropolitan areas. By focusing primarily on public transportation, the law does not enable broader intermodal, intra-system management and financing of the overall mobility system. The AMTs remain a heavily top-down solution, evidenced by the Portuguese Government's control over the majority of appointments for both the General and Executive Councils. The AMTs have been given some paper responsibility for planning, but with no link to funding instruments. The AMTs also have no direct access to investment sources such as PIDDAC funds. According to the law, the AMTs should predict/anticipate the need for subsidies in transport operations and the respective resources for funding them. However, the ability of the AMTs to mediate between the SEE and Finance Ministry remains to be seen. The AMTs will not likely be able to move towards enforceable fiscal discipline of sub-national governments. Finally, regulatory responsibilities remain somewhat murky, in the unclear relationship between the AMTs and IMTT.
For effective sub-national transportation administration and finance in Portugal, AMTs need greater independence from the central government and fuller representation from citizens 24 within the corresponding geographic boundaries. Institutionally, the AMTs could take a first step in the right direction by undertaking a detailed assessment of the nation's transportation finance system, making the system explicit and transparent, following the fiscal federalist principles outlined in this paper. Such an activity appears to fall within the AMTs' legal purview and, presumably, the AMTs would have access to key budgetary details unavailable to us. The central government could also test the effectiveness of, and build the capacity of, the AMTs by endowing them with some grant-making capabilities. For example, Rayle and Zegras (2012) , in an analysis of inter-municipal collaboration in Portugal, find evidence supporting the role of financial incentives in inducing such collaboration. Perhaps the AMTs could be enabled to deploy modest sums for projects of inter-municipal interest, which also seems consistent with the AMT Law. In the end, however, the current law suggests the AMTs may simply represent another organization overlaid on a complex institutional architecture, adding yet one more player to the fight for limited resources.
Conclusion
Fiscal federalism refers to the attribution of administrative, taxing, and spending powers among the different levels of government in a decentralized system. Within fiscal federalism, the metropolitan transportation sector is relevant due to its importance to economic and social development, the multiple layers of government involved, and the key role the public sector plays in service provision, operation, investment, and regulation. Numerous countries around the world are struggling with creating better institutions for metropolitan transportation management.
We examined metropolitan transportation through the lens of fiscal federalism in a (slowly) decentralizing country, Portugal, within the quasi-federalist EU system. Our analysis revealed Portugal's ongoing challenges in financing metropolitan transportation systems.
Fundamentally, Portuguese surface transportation lacks an explicit finance system. The nation's highway PPP system is partly changing this picture via direct tolling, although PPP tolling in metropolitan areas remains limited. Generally, the existing incentives promote the delivery of quantities, with little emphasis on evaluation, heavy dependence on the central government, and risks of financial instability. The lack of a meaningfully direct and transparent connection between the benefits and costs accruing to users reduces the efficiency of both output and the collection and use of nearly all revenue sources. In terms of fiscal equivalency, the system plays out unevenly across Portuguese urban areas -the two largest metropolitan areas depend largely on the central government for public transport operations, while other municipalities mostly fend for themselves. This -partial‖ fiscal equivalency may favor the largest metropolitan areas, although we cannot be sure due to data limitations. Public transportation finance violates fiscal equivalency, with few incentives to match benefits with expenditures. Risks to the sustainability of the subsidized services and to greater macroeconomic stability exist.
A new law creating metropolitan transportation authorities (AMTs) in Lisbon and Porto will not likely ameliorate the fundamental challenges, offering little detail on financial instruments and responsibilities and project evaluation requirements. Ultimately, reform must assign responsibility for transportation administration and finance to sub-national governments and create explicit metropolitan transportation finance systems. Such reform may require changes in the governance system to allow for financially and politically autonomous metropolitan areas. In the short term, infrastructure investment projects require application of transparent and rigorous project evaluation procedures and the creation of stronger co-financing requirements by local governments. Increased private-sector participation (via, e.g., infrastructure concessions) could move in that direction. The AMTs could also theoretically move in this direction, including by conducting an explicit transport system finance analysis through the fiscal federalist lens and serving as an institution for deploying grants for intermunicipal cooperation. Reform of Portugal's transportation finance system remains a question of -when?‖ The government must minimize inefficiencies and inequities in the public finance system; transportation offers an opportunity towards that end. Sources: CP, 2006 MFAP, 2007 MFAP, , 2008 MFAP, , 2009 MFAP, , 2010b MF, 2011 
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Internalizing spatial spillovers & externalities
• Government-granted monopolies over transit in Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas helps internalize regional decision-making
• Voluntary program for the creation of regional partnerships has failed to produce much progress in regional transit planning and administration
Equity (vertical and horizontal)
• EU Cohesion, PIDDAC, and central formula funds help promote horizontal equity in transportation
• Bias of national transportation investment to roadways • Nearly all public transit capital support goes to two metropolitan areas -consider and apply principles and fares for the transport system, its integration, and parking of metropolitan interest -consider, implement and coordinate a metropolitan ticketing system -regulate the commercialization of multimodal transport services and the redistribution of revenues in function of services provided by each operator Dissemination and Development -develop and promote the urban transport image and promote public transport use -disseminate service information, creating and managing information and communication services with the operators -promote innovative technology initiatives and services to improve quality, service and mobility -support, participate and finance research in urban transport and mobility -promote and implement innovative projects and pilot programs 
